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MEN IN STATE PRISON
FRANK T. RAFFERTY
The author is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in the University of Utah and Director of Psychiatric services in the state prison. Prior to 1955 he served as a psychiatrist in the U. S. regular
army in the Korean campaigns. His special interest in the relationship of law and psychiatry-more
generally in the field of social psychiatry-began in that campaign. He is active in the study of group
processes in the treatment of adolescents.-EnrrOi.

In October, 1955, a psychiatric service was
inaugurated at the Utah State Prison as a result
of a long-standing administrative problem in the
management of the psychotic inmate. A part-time
psychiatrist-director, half-time psychologist, fulltime social worker and secretarial staff were
selected to serve this institution which receives all
male felons convicted within the state. Total
population averages 560, with a monthly intake of
approximately 20. This psychiatric team directed
its attention not only to the psychotic inmate,
but acted in a consultant role to prison management; the operation of custody; classification;
parole; and has functioned as a general mental
health service. This function has been quite imperfect and handicapped by many factors such
as the informal prison organization, lack of treatment orientation in prison officials, poorly trained
personnel, etc. Despite many problems, considerable progress has been made in developing a
treatment program. Rigorous research has not
been possible, yet this experience has been significant in influencing the orientation and philosophy
of the psychiatrist director. The primary objective of this paper is to communicate the perspective achieved from this experience with
reference to the tests of criminal responsibility.
These tests have rested on the assumption that
an insane individual should not be subjected to
the punitive-deterrent treatment of criminal law
and the correctional system. Insanity has been
defined in terms of disruption of the cognitive
functions of the ability to know and appreciate
the significance of a given act. To this was added
the ability to control actions by the knowledge
of right and wrong. Over the years these tests have
been severely criticized by most psychiatrists and
it has been stated that scientific criteria of legal
.
responsibility are logically imI.ossible.l 2 Legal
G., T=HE PSYCHOLOGY OF TE ClM'ZILBOORG,
INAL ACT AND PuNmssmmNT-New York, Harcourt
Brace, 1954.

authorities have responded to psychiatric criticism
by attempting various modifications of the tests.
Perhaps the modification recently adopted in the
District of Columbia is to be coisidered the most
advanced of these. It is referred to as the Durham
decision, which holds that the accused is not to be
held criminally responsible for an act which was
the product of a mental disease or defect. Legal
reaction to this test has been considerably less
than enthusiastic. Substantially, this rule amounts
to abandonment of any legal definition of insanity
and the judge is instructed to find the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity if the jury accepts
the evidence of the psychiatrist that the defendant
is mentally ill. To be sure, it is theoretically
necessary that the act be a product of the mental
illness. But interpretation by the court has been
to state that an act shall be a product of the mental
illness if the facts of the act are such as to justify
reasonably the conclusion that but for this disease,
the act would not have been committed.
Psychiatrists will have equal difficulty giving a
precise meaning to mental illness as they have to a
concept of responsibility. One of the greatest
difficulties in epidemiological studies has been the
absence of a satisfactory definition of mental
illness. Applying the concept to the prison population, I find that it either includes a very few of
the inmates or includes most of them. In the first
instance the concept of mental illness implies a
determination of the intactness of cognitive function. In the latter, mental illness is equivalent to
the psychodynamic determinants of behavior.
Prison clinical experience demonstrates that
diagnostic classification is a special complicated
type of value judgment and as Szasz has pointed
out, this special case of category formation depends on the psychological characteristics of the
person engaged in forming categories and the
2 BOARD, RIcHARD G., An Operational Conception

of Criminal Responsibility, Am. J. PsYcH., 113: 332336, Oct., 1956.
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social situation in which he participates.3 It is
apparent that psychiatry has become considerably
more than a medical specialty dealing with a
limited number of individuals who are suffering
from a disease process. In effect, the psychiatrist
has become a student of all behavior and turns to
an integration of the biological and social sciences
for explanatory concepts. Psychiatric nosology
has not developed a classification that adequately
represents our dependence on the Social Sciences.
Despite my conclusion that the psychiatrist as
an expert witness is attempting a scientific and
semantic impossibility in defining criminal responsibility or mental illness, I do not advocate
the abandonment of tests of responsibility. I
believe they serve important and practical functions in our criminal law. Such functions may not
be exactly what we intend them to be, and indeed
we may not know all the latent functions. For
example, Dr. Szasz has suggested that the psychiatric testimony may be one of the many ways
that criminal procedure has to protect the senguilt feelings for hurting a
tencing authorities from
4
fellow human being.
Two more obvious functions served are: (1)
the determination of the appropriateness of
capital punishment and (2) the determination
whether an individual should be confined in a
prison or a hospital. As long as these functions are
necessary, the tests of responsibility are necessary
in some form.
It has not been sufficiently emphasized that
these tests are intimately bound to the concept of
capital punishment. An estimated 25 percent of
new admissions could have legitimately made a
strong plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
under Utah's strict adherence to the M'Naghten
Rules and the irresistible impulse. These men are
confined on such charges as carnal knowledge,
forgery, second degree burglary, failure to provide,
etc. For the most part, the defense of insanity
was not employed. Several different hypotheses to
explain this phenomenon have been considered.
it is possible that this represents an artifact of
the practice of law and psychiatry in Utah and
is not found in other states. It is possible that this
is a product of the practice of allowing offenders
to plead guilty to a lesser offense than the one
3 SZASz, ThomAs, The Problem of Psychiatric Nosology: A Contribution to a Situational Analysis of Psychiatric Operations, All. J. OF PsYcH., 114: 405, 1957.
'SZASz, THOMAS, Psychiatry, Ethics and Crimninal
Law, COLUMBIA L. Rhv.. 58: 194, Feb., 1958.
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charged. It is possible that court appointed attorneys have had neither the interest, time nor
financial resources to attempt to establish the
defense of insanity.
The most probable explanation seems to be that
attorneys turn to insanity as a defense in a desperate attempt to save their client from capital
punishment. If lesser punishment is threatened,
the attorney is inclined to advise his client to
take his chances on serving a short term in prison
as opposed to an indefinite confinement in the
State Hospital. From the psychiatric point of
view, this represents a shortsighted view of the
client's interests. But it does underline a very
real concern on the part of lawyers that commitment procedures do not protect the rights of the
individual, particularly if commitment is for
treatment following a criminal offense.
The tests of responsibility function in a practical
way to determine whether a given individual
should be confined in a prison or a hospital. The
distinction between prison and hospital implies
different things to different people. The prison
implies punishment and the hospital, treatment.
The responsible management of a prison is in the
hands of non-medical personnel. Hospital patients
have mental illnesses. Prison inmates have behavior disorders. Psychiatrists know how to treat
the mental illnesses in hospitals, but do not know
how to treat behavior disorders in prisons. The
confinement in a hospital is different than confinement in prisons. The confinement in prison is
punishment. Confinement in hospitals is ego
supportive.
Each of these points deserve more attention
than is possible here. My essential thesis is that
hospitals and prisons are analogous social institutions developed to serve similar functions
but in different stages of development. Historically, it would seem that prisons and hospitals
have not always been so distinct. Mental illness
has only recently escaped being considered morally
evil and the result of supernatural punishment.
Without medical supervision the correctional
institutions have developed probation and parole,
the pre-sentence investigation, the indeterminate
sentence and penal treatment programs which
are analogous to outpatient therapy, diagnostic
studies and hospital treatment programs. Probably the extent to which prisons have developed
into treatment institutions is not fully appreciated
by those not in correctional work. At Utah State
Prison, up to five percent of the population has
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been on tranquilizing medication. Over one-third
of the population is involved in group therapy.
Many individuals have at least short term access
to individual therapy and milieu therapy is a
general goal of the entire institution. Educational,
recreational and vocational programs are equal
or superior to those of the State Hospital. As
more psychiatric energy, interest and research is
directed to prisons, I am convinced that the distinction between prisons and hospitals will become increasingly blurred.

In summary, clinical psychiatric experience in
prison supports the general psychiatric position
that criteria of criminal responsibility are scientifically impossible. Definition of criminal behavior as a product of mental illness will probably
be equally unsatisfactory. If, however, the tests of
criminal responsibility are conceived as an expedient and pragmatic means of serving important
social functions rather than as a search for scientific truth, psychiatrists should have less objection
to their use in criminal law.

